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ECBThe current ﬁnancial crisis has revived the interest for monitoring both monetary and credit developments.
Over the past two decades, consistent with the adoption of inﬂation targeting strategies by a growing number
of central banks and the development of New Keynesian models for which monetary aggregates are largely
irrelevant, money and credit have been progressively neglected in the conduct of monetary policy. A striking
exception has been the Eurosystem, which has implemented a strategy known as the “two-pillar monetary
policy strategy” giving a prominent role for money. In this paper, we develop a small optimizing model based
on Ireland (2004), estimated on euro area data and featuring this two-pillar strategy. We evaluate an ECB-
style cross-checking policy rule in a DSGE model with real balance effects of money. We ﬁnd some evidence
that indeed money plays a non-trivial role in explaining the euro area business cycle. This provides a rationale
for the central bank to factor in monetary developments but also raises some issues regarding the reliability of
M3 as an appropriate monetary indicator. We ﬁnd some evidence that the ECB has systematically reacted to a
ﬁltered measure of money growth but weak evidence it has reacted more aggressively during excess money
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Clerc).1. Introduction
The current ﬁnancial crisis has reminded both academics and
central bankers of the crucial role played by money and credit in
economic and ﬁnancial developments. Such a renewed interest stems
from two facts. First, central banks too narrowly focused on short-
term price developments and neglecting money and credit growth
may overlook the built-up of ﬁnancial imbalances. In the current crisis
episode for instance, this built-up was associated with an housing
price bubble, fueled by ﬁnancial innovations in the mortgage market
and reﬂected in the balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions, thus in
both money and credit developments. The latter could have informed
the policymaker about growing ﬁnancial risks, would have them been
closely monitored. Second, as a response to this crisis, central banks
have massively expanded their balance sheets in order to stimulate
their economies in a context of near zero interest rates, thereby
expecting some real balance effects of money.
There are three main reasons for why money and credit have been
neglected over the past two decades.
First, the long-term relationship postulated between monetary
developments and inﬂation, and known as the quantity theory ofmoney, has been challenged over time. Despite Lucas' (1980) claim
that the two quantity-theoretic propositions, namely that a given
change in money growth induces an equal change in price inﬂation
and an equal change in nominal rate, “possess a combination of
theoretical coherence and empirical veriﬁcation shared by no other
propositions in monetary economics”, several authors, like McCallum
(1984) and Whiteman (1984), have challenged this view and shown
that these links were in fact regime dependent. In a recent
contribution, Sargent and Surico (2010) show, based on a DSGE
model embedding a money growth rule, that an aggressive policy rule
can prevent the emergence of persistent movement in money growth
and that such a policy regime is also characterized by low low-
frequency correlation between inﬂation and money growth and
between interest rate and money growth. In addition, Goodhart
(1975) shows that “any observed statistical regularity will tend to
collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes.” The
Goodhart's law therefore attribute the breakdown of former low
frequency correlation between money growth and inﬂation to the
implementation of monetary targeting strategies in the 1970s. Finally,
structural shifts in velocity, due for instance to ﬁnancial innovations,
may also account for a reduced correlation between money and
inﬂation. This point is made for example by Lucas (1988) or
Orphanides and Porter (2000) for the US and more recently by
Bordes et al. (2007) for the euro area.
Second, and as a consequence of the former point, the chronic
instability of the relationship between money growth and inﬂation as
well as doubt on the controllability of monetary aggregates in a
context of a rapid pace of ﬁnancial innovations have contributed to
the decline of monetary targeting strategies. These monetary policy
regimes have been progressively replaced by inﬂation targeting
strategies since the beginning of the 1990s. In this new set up,
money and credit can still have an information role, which is limited
at best as a kind of add-on or cross-check. The focus however is
displaced from low-frequency correlations to high-frequency ones,
inﬂation targeting central banks tending to limit their assessment of
risks to price stability to their forecast horizon. Consequently, their
inﬂation target is generally deﬁne over a two or three-year horizon for
which the correlation between money growth and inﬂation is usually
weaker and the information content of money dominated by a wide
set of economic indicators.
Third, New Keynesian models have become predominant, both in
academia and central banks, for monetary policy purposes. In
standard New Keynesian frameworks, such as those developed by
Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford (2003), optimal monetary policy
can be formulated as an interest rate reaction function or policy rule,
which is consistent with the current practice of central banks, but
without any reference to money. Money is usually appended to these
models through a money demand equation. As monetary policy is
implemented by ﬁxing the short-term interest rate, it becomes
essentially endogenous. This feature has led some model builders to
drop money completely from the models used to study monetary
policy.
There are however few attempts to allow for a special role for
money, even in the context of New Keynesian frameworks. Monetary
aggregates can for example play an important role in the context of
imperfect information as indicator variable to deal with data
uncertainty (see of instance Coenen et al., 2005), model uncertainty
and persistent misperception of key economic variables such as the
output gap (see for instance Beck and Wieland, 2008). A even more
active role for money is acknowledged in the context of ﬁnancial
crises for which several authors recommend the switch from an
interest rate rule to a money base rule (see Christiano and Rostagno,
2001 or Christiano et al., 2009). In the vicinity of the zero lower bound
for nominal interest rate, this case is even more stringent (see by
example Orphanides and Wieland, 2000) and provides a rationale for
the implementation of quantitative easing policies.
In this paper, we develop a DSGE model in which money enters
into the structural equations of an otherwise standard New Keynesian
model. Our main objective is to assess the extent to which money
plays an active role in business cycle ﬂuctuations in the euro area and
is factored in by the European Central Bank (ECB hereafter) in the
context of its two-pillar monetary policy strategy. Indeed, since its
inception, the ECB has given a key role to monetary aggregates and
their counterparts to assess the risks to price stability over the
medium term in the euro area. So far, the two-pillar strategy
implemented by the Eurosystem has received little support in the
literature contrary to the inﬂation targeting framework. Christiano et
al. (2006) and Beck andWieland (2007) are the main contributions in
this area. Contrary to Woodford (2007) who argues that there is no
compelling reason to assign a prominent role to monetary aggregates
in the conduct of monetary policy, we defend such a role by noting,
ﬁrst, that amonetary pillar offers an effective anchor for the price level
and therefore would remove the long-term uncertainty about the
price level associated to inﬂation targets and, second, by showing that
indeed money plays an effective role in the economy.
Our “two-pillar” DSGE monetary policy model attempts to reﬂect
both the essence of the Eurosystem's monetary policy framework and
the role of money in the conduct of monetary policy. To analyze this
role, we elaborate on a model developed by Ireland (2004), which is a
small scale DSGE model with sticky prices and monopolistic
competition but without capital accumulation. In our setup, we ﬁrst
allow money to have an effective inﬂuence on both output and
inﬂation and, second, the central bank to react to a ﬁltered money
growth indicator but not necessarily in a linear way. Unlike Ireland(2004) and Andrès et al. (2006), we estimate our model resorting to
Bayesian techniques rather than by maximum likelihood methods. By
doing so, we impose less constraints on key parameters, in particular
on the parameter measuring the effects of real balances on output and
inﬂation. Indeed, the two above mentioned papers impose a non-
negativity constraint on that parameter, which artiﬁcially leads to a
zero coefﬁcient estimate. As a consequence, these authors conclude
that real balances have a limited, if any, role in explaining business
cycle ﬂuctuations. Two recent contributions by Favara and Giordani
(2009) and Canova and Menz (2010) also argue that the cross-
restrictions imposed by Ireland force estimates of the impact of
money on other variables to zero, supporting our main ﬁndings.
By contrast, we show that money plays a non-trivial role in
explaining the euro area business cycle. This provides a rationale for
the central bank to factor in monetary developments but also raises
some issues regarding the reliability of M3 as an appropriate
monetary indicator. We also ﬁnd some evidence that the ECB has
systematically reacted to a ﬁltered measure of money growth but
weak evidence it has reacted more aggressively during excess money
growth periods.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 of the paper presents the
main features of the ECB's strategy andmonetary analysis and theway
wemodel it. Then, Section 3 details our two-pillar DSGEmodel for the
euro area. Section 4 provides the model resolution and estimation.
Finally, Section 5 discusses the role of money according to our
estimates.
2. The European Central Bank and its monetary analysis
In this section, we describe how we model the ECB's decision rule.
First, we present the main features of the ECB monetary analysis and
second we propose a formalization of the ECB's policy rule.
2.1. A quick review of the role of money in the strategy
The most distinctive feature of the European Central Bank's
monetary policy framework has become known as the two-pillar
strategy for assessing risk to price stability. In this very speciﬁc
framework, money is given an important role, which, since the
inception of the ECB, has been signalled by the announcement of a
reference value for the growth of a broad monetary aggregate (M3).
The two-pillar strategy was reviewed in May 2003. While
conﬁrming the use of the two-pillar framework, the ECB's Governing
Council also emphasized that the “monetary analysis” (the former
“ﬁrst pillar” of the strategy) will mainly serve as a mean of cross-
checking, from a long-term perspective, the indication stemming from
the “economic analysis” (the former “second pillar”). In addition, and
to underscore the long-term nature of the reference value, the
Governing Council decided to discontinue the practice of an annual
review. In practice, the reference value has not been reviewed since
the inception of the ECB (it has remained unchanged at 4.5% since
December 1998). This decisionwas interpreted bymost observers as a
downgrading of the role of money.
What is then the real role of money in the ECB's monetary policy
strategy and how is it factored in practice?
As far as the strategy is concerned, the role given to money
acknowledges the fact that monetary growth and inﬂation are closely
related in themedium to long run. Indeed, empirical studies carried out
at the euro area level seem to conﬁrm the monetarist statement
according to which “inﬂation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon” (Friedman, 1963). In a recent contribution, Bordes and
Clerc (2007) try to set out the need to announce a monetary growth
reference value in the context of a two-pillar small backward-looking
macroeconomic model. Their main point is that, contrary to the
assumption usually made in New Keynesian frameworks, the central
bank's inﬂuence over the nominal interest rate does not operate in the
same way in the short term and in the long term. In the short term, the
central bank can inﬂuence the nominal interest rate by increasing the
quantity of money. This increases real balances and lowers the real
interest rate and, consequently, the nominal interest rate through a
liquidity effect. The liquidity effect however does not come into play in
the medium to long run and, consequently, the central bank cannot
inﬂuence the real interest rate. Its only means of action with regard to
the nominal rate is to inﬂuence inﬂation expectations. This can be done
through the announcement of a money supply growth target, which is
derived in a way as to ensure the consistency between short-term and
long-term inﬂation expectations. A similar argument ismade by Nelson
(2008). In this context, the reference value helps to reduce long-term
price level uncertainty and acts as an error-correction mechanism
ensuring the trend stationarity of theprice level. Similarly, in the context
of inaccurate estimates or imperfect knowledge regarding unobserva-
bles such as the output gap, Woodford (2007) and Beck and Wieland
(2007) both argue that the ECB's computation of excess liquidity
(i.e. deviation of actualM3 from the reference value), the cross-checking
and ﬁnally the possibility to change interest rates in response to
sustained deviations of long-run money growth are similar to the
commitment to error-correction and therefore can have some stabili-
zation properties.
In practice, money also seems to play a crucial role in the setting of
monetary policy in the euro area. As an illustration, the ECB's
President, J. C. Trichet, recently declared: “I consider the monetary
pillar has been probably decisive whenwe decided to increase rates in
December 2005, against the advice of the OECD, the IMF, and a
number of observers”, (Financial times, 17 May 2007). However,
implementing “monetary analysis” in the euro area has proven
difﬁcult and very challenging over the recent years as the economy
was hit by several shocks (see Papademos and Stark, 2010 for a
comprehensive overview of monetary analysis and its main chal-
lenges): ﬁnancial instability in the aftermath of the stock market
collapse in 2000 and since Summer 2007, exceptionally high
economic and geopolitical uncertainty between 2001 and 2003. In
addition, there are some signs that a money demand shock occurred
at the beginning of the 2000 s in the euro area, as illustrated by an
apparent structural shift in the trend velocity of money as evidenced
by Bordes et al. (2007). Certainly, the uncertainties surrounding the
assumed underlying trend in M3 income velocity have led the ECB to
downplay the role of the reference value, which, indeed, has not been
referred to in any introductory statement by the ECB's President since
December 2002.
2.2. A two-pillar monetary policy rule
The aim of this subsection is to identify a monetary policy rule
featuring the ECB's two-pillar approach, as clariﬁed in the context of
the review of the monetary policy strategy carried out in May 2003.
The main aspects that we try to encapsulate in our setup are:
– a role for money in the setting of euro area policy rates. The reason
is twofold: ﬁrst, as our model will allow real balances to appear
both in the IS and the Phillips curves, it may be optimal for the
central bank to adjust key policy rates with respect to monetary
developments; second, monetary analysis is one of the two pillars
of the strategy. As such, it complements the information stemming
from the economic analysis, usually summarized by both the
inﬂation and the production stabilization objectives in standard
versions of the Taylor rule.
– a medium to long-term orientation, as initially signalled by the
announcement of a reference value for M3. Indeed, the Governing
Council of the ECB seeks to exploit the long-term relationship
between monetary growth and inﬂation, that is to say tries to see
through the noise in monetary data to recover those underlying
trends which are relevant for monetary policy decisions.– ﬁnally, asmoney is not an intermediate target in the ECB's strategic
framework, strong monetary developments or deviations of M3
growth from the reference value should not trigger a mechanistic
policy reaction. Therefore, in contrast with Ireland (2004),
Christiano et al. (2006) or Bordes and Clerc (2007), who model
the policy rule as an augmented Taylor rule embedding actual
monetary growth and assume a systematic response of the central
bank to monetary developments, we allow for a non-linear or an
asymmetric response of the central bank. In “normal time”, when
the monetary analysis carried by the Governing Council of the ECB
does not signal risk to price stability over the medium run, the
central bank may not or little react to on-going monetary
developments. By contrast, when too strong monetary develop-
ments bear some risks to future price stability, i.e. in the presence
of “excess liquidity”, the central bank may react much stronger to
money growth so as to bring prices to the appropriate or targeted
price level path.
In order to reﬂect these different aspects of the two-pillar strategy,
we ﬁrst allow money growth to enter into a standard Taylor rule, in
addition to the inﬂation and production stabilization objectives.
However, we assume that the central bank, in contrast to the private
sector – households in particular – focuses on a ﬁltered measure of
money growth. As in Beck and Wieland (2007), we assume that the
central bank regularly tests whether ﬁltered money growth still
hovers around its long-term average. More speciﬁcally, we suppose
that the central bank checks the following inequality:
1
Nc
∑
Nc
k=1
μdt−kf −μ ft 
σμ;t
≥ κc ð1Þ
where
μ
bf
t = μ
d
t−1
f + δ μbt − μdt−1f  ð2Þ
is the ﬁlter used to approximate long-run values of money growth. μbt
stands for (linearly de-trended) real money growth. The smoothing
parameter δ could be chosen so as to select a frequency at which long-
run money growth is highly correlated with long-run inﬂation. As
suggested in Gerlach (2004), we choose δ=0.15. κc corresponds to
the critical value considered by the central bank. μ ft =
1
20 ∑
k=20
k=1
μdt−kf is
the mean of the ﬁltered money growth computed over the last 20
periods (i.e. the last ﬁve years in our model), while σμ,t stands for the
standard deviation of μdt−kf computed over the same period. Therefore,
the central bank assesses monetary developments using a time-
varying window in order to capture medium to long-run shifts in
monetary trends or velocity.
If the central bank obtains successive signals of a sustained deviation
of ﬁltered money growth from its medium to long-term average (i.e. if
μdt−kf −μ ft ≥ κcσμ;t on average over the last Nc periods), it responds by
adjusting its key policy rate stronger than would have been the case
otherwise. Therefore, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate
according to the following augmented Taylor-type rule:
rˆt = ρr rdt−1 + 1−ρrð Þ ρy ydt−1 + ρππdt−1 + ρ111 μdt−1f + ρ212 μdt−1f  + ur;t
ð3Þ
where ydt−1 is the lagged output, πdt−1 the lagged inﬂation, 11 and 12
are two dummy variables such that:11=1 if μ
d
t−k
f −μ ft
  b κcσμ;t on
average over the last Nc periods, 11=0 otherwise; 12=1−11.
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Fig. 1. Filtered money growth and thresholds for (κc,Nc)=(1.1,5). The ﬁltered money
growth is in thick line. The smoothing parameter, δ, is set to 0.15. The corridor in dashed
lines deﬁnes the expected range of evolution of the ﬁltered money growth given its last
ﬁve year average and standard deviation. The shaded area stands for regime 2
corresponding to situation with excessive money growth (outside the corridor ﬁltered
money growth) for more than one year.Therefore, the central bank seeks to distinguish between “normal”
periods (or state 1) and inﬂationary ones (state 2), the state of the
economy depending upon monetary dynamics. In this setup, we
expect that ρ2Nρ1≥0. Despite this state-contingent rule, the model
has a unique steady state.1 As an illustration, Fig. 1 displays the
corridor corresponding to the “normal” state, for a choice of (κc,Nc)=
(1.1,5). According to this set of parameters, the euro area economy
was during 59 periods out of 109 in the strong monetary growth state
between 1982 and 2007.
3. A Two-Pillar DSGE model for the euro area
The rest of our model is based on the paper by Ireland (2004), who
develops a small structural model of the monetary policy business
cycle. We only give the main characteristics of this model and refer
the reader to Ireland (2004) for further details. A key feature of this
model is that it allows real balances to appear both in the IS and the
Phillips curves. This direct effect of money on output and inﬂation
could provide a justiﬁcation to include a measure of money growth
into the monetary policy rule as suggested above. But contrary to
Ireland (2004) who add price rigidities à la Rotemberg (1982), we
follow Christiano et al. (2005) and assume that prices are set on a
staggered basis as in Calvo (1983). This is done so as to bring nominal
rigidities into the model in a way that is consistent with and that
provides micro-foundations to the two-pillar Phillips curve's repre-
sentation proposed by Gerlach (2004).
Our economy consists of a representative household, a represen-
tative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm, a continuum of intermediate
goods-producing ﬁrms indexed by i∈ [0,1] and a monetary authority
featuring the European Central Bank already described.
3.1. Households
The representative household chooses real consumption, ct,
government bonds, Bt, hours worked, ht and real money, mt to
maximize his intertemporal utility function:
E ∑
∞
t=0
βtat u ct ;mt = et½ −ηhtf g1 This property follows from the assumption that mt is stationary and thus μ = 1.where β ∈]0,1[ is the discount factor and η is a positive parameter. at
is a preference shock affecting stochastic discount factor while et is a
shock on preference formoney.We also call this latter shock a velocity
shock because it is responsible for shifts in the money demand
equation. The household maximizes this objective subject to the
following budget constraint:
Pt−1mt−1 + Bt−1 + Ptwtht + Dt ≥ Ptmt +
Bt
rt
+ Ptct
Where Pt denotes the nominal price of ﬁnished good at time t. The
household's sources of funds consist of money carried into period t,
Pt−1mt−1, the value of nominal zero-coupon Bonds, Bt−1, the labor
income Ptwtht where wt is the real wage and the nominal dividend
payments, Dt, received from the intermediate goods-producing
ﬁrms. The use of these funds includes consumption, Ptct, purchasing
of newly-issued bonds of Bt/rt, where rt is the gross nominal interest
rate decided by the central bank, and the money, Ptmt to be carried
into period t+1.
In this setup, the main difference with the standard New
Keynesian assumptions is that money yields utility and that money
and consumption may be non-separable in the utility function of the
representative household. The ﬁrst assumption is a shortcut to
capture cash-in-advance without imposing constraint as shown by
Feenstra (1986). The latter assumption implies that real balances may
enter into the IS curve and into the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, i.e.
opens up a channel through which money can affect both output and
inﬂation.
The preference and money demand shocks, at and et, follow ﬁrst
order autoregressive processes as in Ireland (2004):
ln atð Þ = ρa ln at−1ð Þ + a;t ð4Þ
ln et = eð Þ = ρe ln et−1 = eð Þ + e;t ð5Þ
Where ρa and ρe are the persistence of shocks, a,t and e,t i.i.d zero-
mean gaussian random variables with σa and σe standard deviations
and e is the steady-state of the shock et.
3.2. Firm behavior and price setting
Concerning the productive sector, our setup is similar to that of
Smets and Wouters (2003). We assume that the ﬁnal sector is
perfectly competitive and products ﬁnal goods with a Dixit-Stiglitz
technology. This leads to an imperfect competitive market in the
intermediary sector. Moreover, intermediary ﬁrms set their prices on
a staggered basis à la Calvo. When they can not reset their prices, they
can partially index their prices on last inﬂation rate. To close the ﬁnal-
goods market, we assume that aggregate demand is reduced to
consumption so that output and consumption are assumed to be
equal (market clearing condition).
3.2.1. Finished goods-producing ﬁrms
At each period, the representative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm
uses yt(i) units of each intermediate good i∈ [0,1], purchased at the
nominal price Pt(i) to manufacture yt units of the ﬁnished good
according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology describes by
yt = ∫
1
0
yt ið Þ θ−1ð Þ=θdi
 θ= θ−1ð Þ ð6Þ
where θ N1. The ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm chooses yt(i) to
maximize its proﬁts. This maximization leads to the following
demand to the intermediate ﬁrm, i:
yt ið Þ =
Pt ið Þ
Pt
 −θ
yt ð7Þ
which reveal that θ measures the constant price elasticity of demand
for each intermediate good i ∈ [0,1]. The price Pt is deﬁned by:
Pt = ∫
1
0
Pt ið Þ1−θdi
 1= 1−θð Þ2 As an example, we can think of the non separable utility function
u c;mð Þ = c
1−σ1
1−σ1
m1−σ 2
1−σ2
. The condition ω2b0 corresponds to a value σ2N1, and a
strong concavity of the utility function with respect to money. See for instance Gabriel
et al., (2007).3.2.2. Intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms
Even if we do not include capital in our model, the representative
household owns the intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms, earns
dividends and chooses to maximize the proﬁts according to its own
pricing-kernel as in Smets and Wouters (2003). Hence, because
money matters in the utility function, households modify optimal
price decision depending on the evolution of real balances. That is the
reason why money ﬁnally enters in the Phillips curve.
Each intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm hires ht(i) units of
labor from the representative household to manufacture yt(i) units
of intermediate good i according to the following production
function:
yt ið Þ = ztF ht ið Þð Þ ð8Þ
where F is increasing and concave and zt is the aggregate productivity
shock, which is assumed to follow a ﬁrst order autoregressive
process:
ln zt = zð Þ = ρz ln zt−1 = zð Þ + εz;t ; εz;t∼N 0;σzð Þ ð9Þ
where 1NρzN0, zN0. In equilibrium, this supply side disturbance acts
as a shock to the Phillips curve.
The intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm sells its output in a
monopolistically competitive market and sets nominal prices on a
staggered basis, as in Calvo (1983). More formally, the ﬁrm resets its
price with probability 1−αp , independently of the time elapsed since
the last price adjustment. The remaining ﬁrms, with probability αp, set
prices according to the following rule:
PT ið Þ = π1−γp
PT−1
PT−2
 γp
PT−1 ið Þ = ΓTPT−1 ið Þ: ð10Þ
that is to say that a ﬁrm that cannot optimally adjust its price sets it as
a convex combination of past inﬂation and steady state inﬂation π.
This framework implies that lagged inﬂation will enter into the
linearized Phillips curve. Note that setting the inﬂation persistence
parameter, γp, to zero would result in the standard Calvo model (i.e. a
setup in which non-optimally adjusting ﬁrms would simply change
their prices at the pace of steady state inﬂation).
The ﬁrms that do adjust their prices at date t do so by maximizing
the expected discounted value of current and future proﬁts converted
into household's utility. Proﬁts at some future date t+ j are affected by
the choice of price at time t only if the ﬁrm has not received another
opportunity to adjust between t and t+ j. Let Pt⋆ denotes the price
chosen at date t and yt,T⋆ (i) the production of good i at date T if the ﬁrm
has not reset its price since date t. The ﬁrm's pricing decision problem
then involves picking Pt⋆ to maximize
Πt = Et ∑
∞
T= t
βαp
 T−t λT
λt
Γt;T
P⋆t ið Þ
PT
y⋆t;T ið Þ−wTF−1 y⋆t;T ζð Þ= zt
 	 

ð11Þ
with respect to (7):
y⋆t;T ið Þ = Γt;T
P⋆t ið Þ
PT
 −θ
yT ð12Þ
where λt/Pt in Eq. (11) measures the marginal utility value to the
representative household of an additional euro in proﬁts received
during period t and wt measures the real wage paid by the ﬁrm. Γt,T
is the coefﬁcient which embodies the updating process of the
prices.For all t=0, 1, 2,... the ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are:
Et ∑
∞
T= t
βαp
 T−t
λT Γt;T
P⋆t ið Þ
Pt
Pt
PT
−μ wT
zt
F−1
 
′ y
⋆
t;T
zt
 !" #
= 0 ð13Þ
where μ is the mark-up rate given by μ =
θ
θ−1.
3.3. Equilibrium and money
First we derive the ﬁrst order conditions of economic agents in our
economy, then we compute the steady-state and ﬁnally we log-
linearize the equations around the steady state through a ﬁrst order
Taylor approximation as in Uhlig (1999) and Woodford (2003). Once
log-linearized, the ﬁrst-order conditions yield the following reduced
form equations:
ybt = Et ydt+1 −ω1 rˆt−Et πdt+1   + ω2 mˆt−Et mdt+1  
−ω2 1−ρeð Þeˆt + ω1 1−ρað Þaˆt
ð14Þ
πˆt−γp πˆt−1 = βEt πdt+1−γp πˆt  + κp ωp + 1ω1
 
yˆt
−κp
ω2
ω1
mˆt− eˆt
 
−κp 1 + ωp
 
zt
ð15Þ
mˆt = γ1 yˆt−γ2 rˆt + γ3 eˆt ð16Þ
rˆt = ρr rdt−1 + 1−ρrð Þ ρy ydt−1 + ρππdt−1 + ρ111 μdt−1f + ρ212 μdt−1f  + ur;t
ð17Þ
μˆ ft = μˆ
f
t−1 + δ mˆt−mˆt−1− μˆ
f
t−1
 
ð18Þ
where Xt = log
Xt
X
is the log-deviation of X to its steady state value.
The model includes four ﬁrst-order autoregressive shocks: a prefer-
ence shock at, a velocity shock et, a productivity shock zt and a
monetary policy shock ur,t.
Eq. (14) represents a forward-looking IS curve. It allows changes in
real balances to directly affect the dynamics of output. All of the
parameters, with the possible exception of ω2, ought to be non-
negative. The parameter ω2 measures the effect of real balances on
aggregate output. This parameter is negatively proportional to the
cross derivative of utility function (in consumption andmoney). Thus,
some authors (cf. Ireland (2004) or Andrès et al. (2006)) test the non-
separability hypothesis by testing whether this parameter is equal to
zero or not (ω2≠0). If it is strictly positive, then money and
consumption are complements as assumed in the mainstream
literature; if it is negative, then the marginal utility of consumption
is decreasing with respect to real balances.2 Eq. (15) is a forward-
looking Phillips curve that allows changes in real balances to also have
an impact on the dynamics of inﬂation whenω2≠0. As in Ireland, it is
worth pointing out, ﬁrst, that real money balances enter into the IS
curve if and only if they enter into the forward-looking phillips curve
and, second, that what really matters for the dynamics of output and
inﬂation are ﬂuctuations in real balances once shifts in velocity have
been factored in. Indeed, output and inﬂation in Eqs. (14) and (15) can
be written as functions of mˆt− eˆt
 
. Eq.(16) is a money demand
function with income elasticity γ1 and interest semi-elasticity γ2.
Eq. (17) is the non-linear augmented Taylor rule, featuring the two-
3 We reject the ﬁrst 100 000 iterations before keeping around 160 000 iterations
from the MCMC algorithm. We check the convergence of the distribution by looking at
real-time moments of the chain.
4 The countries taken into account in the aggregation are the 16 members of the
euro area: Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland.
5 The aggregation is based on the so called “Index method” and most of the weights
used for aggregating countries data are the constant GDP at market prices (PPP) for
1995.
6 Precisely, we calibrate αp=0.63 because of difﬁculties in estimation of this
parameter, which gives for a standard value of θ=8, κp=0.05.pillar monetary policy reaction function of the ECB. Finally, Eq. (18)
links ﬁltered money growth to the evolution of money.
4. Resolution and estimation
4.1. Resolution
Since we allow for a non-linear monetary policy reaction function
to money, solving the model by standard linear method is impossible.
We thus slightly adapt themethodology developed by Uhlig (1999) to
approximate the solution function. To get the gist of the resolution
method, we consider that agents do not forecast the next state of the
economy but solve the twomodels associatedwith each possible state
of the economy (i.e. normal vs excessive money growth) indepen-
dently. This approach differs from a Markov–Switching model since
endogenous variables completely determine the shift between the
two regimes.
More formally, we elaborate on Uhlig (1999) and suppose that the
log-linearized equilibrium relationship can be written as:
Et FXt+1 + GtXt + Ht−1Xt−1 + RZt + SZt−1
 
= 0 ð19Þ
where the vectors Xt and Zt are given by:
Xt =
yˆt
πˆt
rˆt
μˆ ft
266666664
377777775; Zt =
eˆt
aˆt
zˆt
uˆr;t
2666664
3777775
and where the matrices F, Gt, Ht−1, R and S are the matrices collecting
the coefﬁcients. Gt and Ht−1 are time-dependent and respectively
take two values g1, g2 and h1, h2 depending on the state of the
economy in t and t−1.
We consider two different models, one associated with the policy
reaction coefﬁcient ρ1 (state 1, model 1) and the other with the policy
reaction coefﬁcient ρ2 (state 2, model 2). Owing to Uhlig, we can
compute the transition matrices p1, q1, l1, respectively p2, q2, l2, which
correspond to the version of the model in state 1, respectively in
state 2.
The solutions of model 1 and model 2 are then given by:
Xt+1 = p1 Xt + l1Ztð Þ + q1Zt+1; ð20Þ
Xt+1 = p2 Xt + l2Ztð Þ + q2Zt+1; ð21Þ
To solve the model described by Eq. (19), we assume that the
transition matrices only depend on the state of the economy at time t
and not on previous periods; precisely, if the state at time t is 1,
transition equation is given by (20), if the state at time t is 2, transition
equation is given by (21), depending on past ﬁltered money growth.
4.2. Estimation
Contrary to Ireland (2004) or Andrès et al. (2006), we did not
choose to compute the maximum of likelihood as such computation
hardly converges toward a global maximum. Indeed, in our ﬁrst
attempts, we found the likelihood function ill-behaved, with multiple
local peaks and large ﬂat areas. Both Ireland (2004) and Canova and
Menz (2010) report similar difﬁculties in estimating such a model
resorting to Maximum Likelihood techniques. Therefore, as in
Schorfheide (2000) or Smets and Wouters (2003), we applied
Bayesian techniques to estimate the model. We refer to An and
Schorfheide (2007) and Villaverde (2010) for a detailed review on
Bayesian inference. The latter reviews the different arguments in favorof Bayesian approach : the sparsity in the data, the ﬂexibility of the
DSGE models, and the fact that, in such models, likelihood is often ﬂat
in certain directions and may have multiple maxima and minima. The
limits of the Maximum Likelihood inference stems from the lack of
informative content of the data to precisely identify all the structural
parameters of the model. Bayesian approach is an objective protocol
to complete available information given by the sample with economic
a priori on the structural parameters. These a priori on the parameters
deform the likelihood function of the model in some directions. This
approach accounts for a signiﬁcative methodological march with
respect to theminimization of the distance between impulse response
functions of themodel and those of a VAR, as for instance in Christiano
et al. (2005). In particular, using Bayesian approach allows us to
compare rigorously different models through their marginal densities
as proposed by Geweke (1998).
Since our approximative solution is time dependent and backward-
looking, we adapt the Kalman ﬁlter and the computation presented by
Hamilton (1994) to obtain the likelihood recursively. Then, the sample
log-likelihood conjugated with the prior distributions of parameters
provide us with the posterior kernel distribution of a set of parameters.
We compute the posterior kernel thanks to a RandomWalk Metropolis
Hastings Algorithm.3
We approximate the log-marginal density of the data by the
Laplace Approximation and use it to compare different models
(Geweke, 1998). Moreover, we assess the ability of these different
models to replicate euro area stylized facts by comparing the
theoretical and empirical autocovariances. While the log-marginal
density provides us with a single value to rank alternative models, we
can discuss the limits and the differences between differentmodels by
comparing the autocovariances.4.3. Data
To estimate the parameters of our DSGE model, we use data over
the period 1980Q2–2007Q2 on four key macroeconomic variables for
the Euro Area as a whole4: real GDP per capita, the growth of real
money M3 per capita, CPI inﬂation rate and the 3-month short-term
nominal interest rate. These Data are extracted from the Euro Area
WideModel database (Fagan et al., 2001).5We also use the labor force
data to normalize output and money growth. We use Eurostat data
and linear projection (for 2006–2007) to update the labor force data.
All the data are linearly detrended before the estimation.4.4. Assumptions and priors
In our benchmark estimation, four parameters are calibrated. The
long-run nominal interest rate and the long-term inﬂation rate, π, are
calibrated to 1.018 and 1.009 which correspond to their average
values over our sample. This implies a discount factor, β, equal to
0.991. We ﬁx the technology production function such that the labor
income share in total output is 60%, so that ωp=0.43. Finally, we set
the slope of the Phillips curve κp=0.05.6 We directly estimate σ=1/
ω1, as prior is easier to deﬁne for this parameter.
Table 1
Estimation results. The ﬁrst three columns deﬁne the a priori distribution. Model 1 corresponds to the model without money. Model 2 allows real balances in the model. Model 3
allows the monetary authority to react to ﬁltered money growth. Model 4 and 5 introduce non-linearity in the monetary policy response to ﬁltered money growth. Marginal density
stands for the likelihood of the model according to the data (see Geweke, 1998). The last two lines report the mean of ρ2−ρ1 and the percentage of draws for which rho1Nρ2 in the
Monte Carlo Markov Chain.
Parameters (κc·Nc) Prior distributions Posterior modes
Law Mean Standard
deviation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ω2=0 ρ=0 ρ1=ρ2 ρ1≠ρ2(1.1,5) ρ1≠ρ2(1.4,4)
General parameters
Discount factor, β Calibrated 0.991 – 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ=1/ω1 Normal 1.5 0.38 2.382 1.337 1.814 1.917 1.903
Cross relation money-consumption, ω2 Normal 0.1 10 – −4.885 −2.843 −3.123 −3.095
Income elasticity of money demand, γ1 Normal 0.014 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.025 0.019 0.017
Interest elasticity of money demand, γ2 Normal 0.72 0.1 0.732 0.724 0.695 0.702 0.707
Steady State interest rate, r Calibrated 1.018 – 1.018 1.018 1.018 1.018 1.018
Calvo indexation γp Beta 0.24 0.1 0.147 0.135 0.108 0.079 0.100
Calvo probability αp Calibrated 0.63 – 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
Curvature of production function ωp Calibrated 0.43 – 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
Persistences
Velocity shock, ρe Beta 0.5 0.2 0.906 0.943 0.931 0.918 0.924
Preference shock, ρa Beta 0.5 0.2 0.980 0.976 0.989 0.980 0.984
Productivity shock, ρz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.937 0.872 0.888 0.908 0.905
Monetary policy shock, ρε Beta 0.5 0.2 0.281 0.346 0.567 0.506 0.504
Standard deviations
Velocity shock, σe Inverse gamma 0.1 ∞ 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.020
Preference shock, σa Inverse gamma 0.1 ∞ 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Productivity shock, σz Inverse gamma 0.1 ∞ 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014
Monetary policy shock, σr Inverse gamma 0.1 ∞ 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Monetary policy rule
Weight of past interest rate, ρr Beta 0.5 0.2 0.766 0.776 0.651 0.673 0.687
Weight of output, ρy Normal 0.125 0.05 0.111 0.147 0.134 0.115 0.104
Weight of inﬂation, ρπ Normal 1.7 1 1.535 1.091 0.677 0.736 0.776
Weight of money growth (normal times regime), ρ1 Normal 1.2 0.5 – – 1.327 1.095 1.222
Weight of money growth (excess liquidity regime), ρ2 Normal 1.2 0.5 – – 1.327 1.569 1.519
Marginal density 1895 1913.9 1943.1 1945.7 1942.9
Mean on the MH simulations bρ2−ρ1N 0.474 0.30
Share of draws where ρ1Nρ2 0.06% 4.9%As in Smets and Wouters (2003), the standard errors of the
innovations are assumed to follow inverse gamma distributions (see
Table 2). We choose Beta distributions for shock persistence
parameters with mean 0.5 and standard error 0.2 as well as for the
backward component of the Taylor rule. Indeed this kind of
distribution covers the whole interval ]0,1[. For the same reason,
the prior for the indexation of non-optimized prices is set to follow a
Beta distribution with mean 0.24 and standard error 0.1, which is
consistent with Ireland's results for the US economy. Other priors
follow Gaussian distributions. The prior for γ1 is consistent with the
estimates of Ireland, slightly smaller than in the literature.7We choose
a positive prior mean for ω2, as suggested in the literature but a very
large standard error equal to 10 to allow for the possibility ofω2 being
positive or negative. Because the introduction of a non-linear Taylor
rule is novel in the literature, priors for ρ1 and ρ2 are assumed to be
equal. The mean of the prior equals 1.2. This prior is slightly higher
than in Andrès et al. (2006) but is consistent with the results of Poilly
(2007).
4.5. Results of the estimations
Weprovide the results of the Bayesian estimation in Tables 1 and 2.
We complete several estimates, which are summarized in Table 1. The
ﬁrst set of estimates corresponds to the model with a separable utility7 We point out that with a prior centered around 1, the obtained estimates are quite
similar. Brief reminder on the results of Ireland (2004) γ1=0.01 for the US, Andrès
et al. (2006) γ1∈ [0.04;0.118] for the EA, these authors show that the value of this
parameter is lower than other studies and depends on the ﬁltering of the data.function (ﬁrst column), i.e. a situation in which money does not have
an active role in the business cycle. This model corresponds to the
standard New Keynesianmodel as presented inWoodford (2003) and
our results are in line with the estimations of Ireland (2004) for the US
and Andrès et al. (2006) for the Euro area. The second model
corresponds to a non separable utility function and a simple Taylor
rule. Hence, we consider a model in which money may matter for the
business cycle but the central bank decides to not directly react to
monetary developments. Column 2 of Table 1 summarizes the results.
The obtained estimates are stable with respect to the ﬁrst model and
we ﬁnd a very negative value for ω2. In the remaining versions, we
consider augmented Taylor rules taking into account ﬁltered money
growth (ρ≠0) and eventually introduce a non-linear reaction to it.
First, we consider that central bank can react to monetary develop-
ment but not in a state-contingent way (column 3, ρ1=ρ2). In this
model, we notice that the main parameters of the model except those
of the Taylor rule remain stable. As far as the Taylor rule is concerned,
we ﬁnd a strong reaction of the central bank to ﬁlteredmoney growth.
This reaction to money growth induces a weaker reaction to inﬂation
(ρπ=0.677). Then, we introduce a state contingent-policy rule and
consider a set of different values for (κc,Nc), mainly for robustness
checks (the two last columns of Table 1). In these two last cases, we
ﬁnd a higher response to monetary growth in the excess liquidity
regime than in the normal time regime. For the sake of clarity, we
mainly develop further analysis for theﬁrst set of parameters (κc,Nc)=
(1.1,5) and we refer to this model as the state-contingent model.
Fig. 2 shows the posteriors obtained thanks to Metropolis Hastings
algorithm in this last case (model 4) and provides some insights on the
quality of the estimates. Precisely, we correctly estimate the persistences
Table 2
Estimation results in details. The ﬁrst three columns deﬁne the a priori distribution. We report here the results of the Metropolis Hastings algorithm for the Model 4, i.e. with money
in the utility function and potential non-linear response of interest rate to ﬁltered money growth.
Parameters Prior distributions posterior Posterior distribution (from MCMC)
Law Mean Standard deviation Mode Mean 5% Median 95%
General parameters
Discount factor, β Calibrated 0.991 – 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ=1/ω1 Normal 1.5 0.38 1.884 1.917 1.413 1.910 2.4363
Cross relation money-consumption, ω2 Normal 0.1 10 −2.798 −3.123 −4.842 −3.019 −1.756
Income elasticity of money demand, γ1 Normal 0.014 0.01 0.019 0.019 0.010 0.018 0.027
Interest elasticity of money demand, γ2 Normal 0.72 0.1 0.711 0.702 0.537 0.700 0.876
Steady state interest rate r Calibrated 1.018 – 1.018 1.018 1.018 1.018 1.018
Calvo indexation γp Beta 0.24 0.1 0.079 0.101 0.043 0.095 0.187
Calvo probability αp Calibrated 0.63 – 0.630 0.630 0.630 0.630 0.630
Curvature of production function ωp Calibrated 0.43 – 0.430 0.430 0.430 0.430 0.430
Persistences
Velocity shock, ρe Beta 0.5 0.2 0.923 0.918 0.887 0.919 0.9470
Preference shock, ρa Beta 0.5 0.2 0.984 0.980 0.968 0.980 0.9932
Productivity shock, ρz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.922 0.908 0.857 0.909 0.9565
Monetary policy shock, ρε Beta 0.5 0.2 0.564 0.506 0.262 0.496 0.782
Standard deviations
Velocity shock, σe Inverse Gamma 0.1 ∞ 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.019 0.025
Preference shock, σa Inverse gamma 0.1 ∞ 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Productivity shock, σz Inverse gamma 0.1 ∞ 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.016
Monetary policy shock, σr Inverse gamma 0.1 ∞ 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Monetary policy rule
Weight of past interest rate, ρr Beta 0.5 0.2 0.653 0.673 0.524 0.687 0.780
Weight of output, ρy Normal 0.125 0.05 0.114 0.115 0.058 0.116 0.170
Weight of inﬂation, ρπ Normal 1.7 1 0.665 0.736 0.473 0.734 1.009
Weight of money growth (normal times regime), ρ1 Normal 1.2 0.5 1.046 1.095 0.776 1.081 1.456
Weight of money growth (excess liquidity regime), ρ2 Normal 1.2 0.5 1.475 1.569 1.176 1.556 2.003and the variances of the shocks as the posterior distribution is narrower
than the prior distribution meaning that data are really informative
concerning these parameters. This graph also shows thatwewell identify0 2 40
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Fig. 2. Priors and posteriors for a state contingent policy rule (Model 4). The dashed blue lines
the posterior distributions resulting from the Metropolis Hastings algorithm.a negative sign of the cross relation money-consumption, ω2. Neverthe-
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correspond to the a priori distributions of the deep parameters, while the red lines show
substitution,σ=1/ω1, and theweight of output in the Taylor rule ρy. The
other coefﬁcients of the rule are well estimated.
5. Does money matter?
This section presents our main ﬁndings. First, we show that money
matters and thatmonetary policy has systematically reacted tomoney
growth. Second, we assess the main consequences of this departure
from the standard literature on the ability of our model to track
economic ﬂuctuations.
5.1. A role for money
The ﬁrst question we want to address is the relevance of monetary
developments to explain euro area data. As can be seen in Table 1, the log
marginal posterior difference betweenmodel 2 (ρ=0only) andmodel 1
(ω2=0andρ=0) is 18.9. Therefore, to choosemodel 1overmodel 2,we
need a prior probability over model 1 1.6×108 (exp(18.9)) times larger
than our prior probability over model 2. This evidence supports the
assumption that money matters for the business cycle in the euro area.
As regards the parameters of interest, the response of aggregate
demand (ω1=1/σ) to changes in the real rate is signiﬁcant andbroadly in
line with the estimates provided by Andrès et al. (2006) for the euro area
but far above the estimates provided by Ireland for the United States. As
far as money demand is concerned, the elasticity with respect to interest
rates (γ2=0.7) is broadly in linewith other estimate in the literature, but
the income elasticity is very small (γ1=0.01/0.02) in sharp contrast with
standard estimates for the euro area, generally slightly above 1. However,
this may reﬂect the instability of money demand functions estimated on
euro area data and evidenced over the last ﬁve years.8
The posterior mode of ω2, the parameter measuring the impor-
tance of real balances in the IS and Phillips curves, is negative and
signiﬁcant, whatever the version of the model. Therefore, this
estimate associates an increase in real balances with a decrease in
output and an increase in inﬂation. Though this result may seem at
odd with the related literature, in particular Ireland (2004) and
Andrès et al. (2006), few points are worth mentioning. First, both
Ireland and Andrès and co-authors, who basically replicate Ireland's
approach to euro area data, constrain that parameter to be positive;
this technical assumption combined with the fact that the maximum
is obtained in zero casts doubts on the effective positivity of ω2. As a
consequence, these authors conclude that real balances have a
limited, if any, role in explaining business cycle ﬂuctuations. Second,
the sign of ω2 ultimately depends upon the properties of the utility
function of the representative household and therefore can take either
a positive or a negative sign. We leave open that possibility by
assuming a ﬂatter as possible prior distribution for ω2. Thus, we let
data decides which function of money is dominant between the mean
of transaction function and the store of value. A negative sign would
imply that money acts as a substitute to consumption and that the
store value effect is dominant. In such a case, a rise in inﬂation
increases the nominal interest rate and leads to a decrease in money
demand. As consumption and money are substitutes, consumption
rises and leisure falls. Work effort then rises and with it output.
We turn now to the monetary policy rule. As money seems to
matter to understand the dynamic of euro area data and as the
Eurosystem's monetary strategy rely on a monetary pillar, it may be
optimal for the European Central Bank to systematically take into
account a measure of money growth in its reaction function.9 In the8 Indeed, our estimates are very sensitive to the assumptions made on the priors of
the parameters entering the money demand function.
9 See the pre-version of Beck and Wieland (2007). Even though they integrate
money as a proxy of expected inﬂation, their result tends to prove that including
money growth in Philipps Curve implies a monetary policy depending on money
growth.version 3 of our model (see Table 1, column 6), we suppose a constant
and systematic reaction to the ﬁltered money growth, μ t−1f . We set
the value of the smoothing parameter δ to 0.15. This implies that the
half of a one-off rise in actual money growth would disappear after
4.5-quarters.10 The weight of money growth in the policy rule is
estimated around (1−ρr)ρ=(1−0.651)⁎1.33=0.46. Andrès et al.
(2006) ﬁnds a slightly smaller result (0.35) for the euro area over a
similar sample period. However, they suppose that the ECB reacts to
actual money growthwhereas we assume it reacts to the deviations of
ﬁltered money growth to its long-term average.
The introduction of monetary growth into the Taylor rule has a
sizeable impact on the key parameters of the rule. For instance, the
weight of the inﬂation decreases and becomes smaller than in
standard Taylor-type rules without money. The gain of adding money
growth into monetary policy rule is clearly identiﬁed by the log-
marginal density. The log marginal likelihood difference between
models with an augmented Taylor rule (model 3) and with a simple
Taylor rule is 29.2. This result implies that we need a prior probability
over model 2 4.8×1012 times larger than our prior probability over
model 3 in order to reject the fact that includingmoney into the policy
reaction function improves the ﬁt to the data.
Does the ECB react stronger to high monetary growth or put
another way to “excess liquidity”? To answer this question, we
estimate our model including a non-linear state-dependent monetary
policy reaction function that factors in ﬁltered money growth.
Although we assume the same priors for the both coefﬁcients, the
mode of the posterior distribution indicates that ρ1=1.01 and
ρ2=1.57 for the parameters (κc,Nc) set to (1.1,5). In the last two
lines of Table 1, we report the mean of the posterior distribution of ρ2
−ρ1 and the ratio of draws where ρ1 is higher than ρ2 in the Monte
Carlo Markov Chain. According to the posterior distribution, this
difference is positive for 99.94% of posterior draws (see Table 1).
Besides, there is a difference of 2.6 between the log-data density of
this setup and the previous one without threshold, which shows that,
for this choice of parameters (κc,Nc), to chose model 3 over model 4,
we need a prior probability over model 3 13.6=exp(2.6) times larger
than our prior probability over model 4. This would tend to show that,
indeed, the European Central Bank tends to react more aggressively
when money growth moves away from its long-term average.11
Finally, the fact that ρ1 is strictly different from zero is consistent with
the fact that money matters for the euro area economy. Though ρ1 is
signiﬁcantly different from ρ2, such difference doesn't seem to matter
a lot as far as the ﬁt to the data is concerned.5.2. Stabilizing properties of our augmented Taylor Rule
This subsection is devoted to the analysis of the ability of ourmodel to
replicate the euro area economy dynamics. To this aim, we study the
impulse response functions to a velocity shock, a preference shock, a
productivity shock and a monetary policy shock in different cases. We
also consider the autocovariances in our analysis. Since the marginal
likelihood is higher for model 4, we consider that the estimates obtained
for the parameters in this model are the most relevant. We want to
underline the impact of taking money into account into monetary policy
rule and we consider alternative policy rules without money. The
considered monetary policy rules are those with monetary growth of
model 4, a monetary policy rule estimated on the euro area over the
period 93–04 by Gerdesmeier et al. (2007), and a Taylor rule without
money estimated when we ﬁx the other parameters of the model.1210 See Gerlach (2004) for more discussion about the value of λ.
11 This result depends on the choice of (κc,Nc), but remains in most of likely cases.
12 The coefﬁcients for the Taylor rule given by Gerdesmeier et al. (2007) are ρr=0.9,
ρy=0.83 and ρπ=1.5, while the simulated coefﬁcients for the Taylor rule without
money are ρr=0.74, ρy=0.088 and ρπ=1.24.
Fig. 3. Comparison of empirical and theoretical autocovariances. These ﬁgures display the covariances between the variables in line and the lagged variables in column. In red, we
plot the autocovariances predicted by the model with augmented Taylor rule (model 4) and in dashed red lines, the conﬁdence intervals. In blue line with stars, the theoretical
autocovariances of a model with a calibrated Taylor rule following Gerdesmeier et al. (2007). In green with circles, the autocovariances predicted by the model with a simple Taylor
rule (model 2). In any cases, the model includes money in the utility function. Finally in black with full squares, the empirical autocovariances computed on the studied sample.Concerning the impulse response functions, the introduction of
money in the policy rule affects the response of the economy to a
money demand shock (see Fig. 4). A velocity shock leads to a less than
proportional increase in ﬁltered monetary growth μtf, so that moneyFig. 4. Impulse response function to a velocity shock (e). In thick blue, we plot the impulse re
(no excess of liquidity) and in dashed blue line, in regime 2 (of excess liquidity). In discontin
rule. And in dashed green, we plot the IRF if the monetary authority is forced to follow theadjusted for velocity shifts decreases. In a “standard” Taylor rule, the
substitution effect between consumption and money adjusted from
velocity shift implies a positive effect on y. The impact on inﬂation is
the combination of two effects: ﬁrst, the marginal propensity tosponse functions (IRF) for the model with augmented Taylor rule (model 4) in regime 1
uous red line with crosses, we display the IRF for the model 2, i.e. with a simple Taylor
Taylor rule estimated by Gerdesmeier et al. (2007).
consume increases implying the fall of real wage and ﬁnally a
downward pressure on prices, second the inﬂationary effect stem-
ming from the widening of the output gap. The former effect is
dominating in this case, and inﬂation reacts negatively. When money
growth is accounted for by the central bank, the substitution effect
betweenmoney adjusted from velocity shift and consumption is more
than compensated by the surge in the anticipated interest rate due to
the inclusion of money growth in the Taylor rule. The overall impact
on output is therefore negative too. Then, the central bank increases
its nominal interest rate, since μtf enters with a one-period lag into the
Taylor-type rule, while both output and inﬂation increase due to the
mechanical decrease of money growth. The growth effect is
preponderant in the response of inﬂation. For this kind of shock, the
response to money growth implies a higher volatility of both output
and inﬂation, and a higher standard quadratic loss for the central
bank. This result is consistent with Pool (1970), suggesting that a
central bank that would react to money demand shocks without
adjusting the money supply to keep its key interest rate unchanged
would indeed generate greater output and inﬂation volatility.
The responses to a preference shock are quite similar whenmoney
is taken into account or not in the Taylor Rule (see Fig. 5). This kind of
shock leads to an intertemporal change in the structure of prefer-
ences. Then, consumption and money rise, inﬂation rises due to the
widening of the output gap. A productivity shock leads to standard
responses for supply shocks (see Fig. 6). Consumption reacts
positively and inﬂation is decreasing owing to downward pressures
on marginal costs. In the case of the Gerdesmeier et al. (2007). Taylor
rule, the response of output is lower but strictly positive. Indeed, due
to the higher weight of output in the Taylor rule, expectations of
consumption are lower implying a lower increase of current output.
The responses to a preference shock and a productivity shock are
consistent with other studies like Smets and Wouters (2003).
In the case of a monetary policy shock, money is decreasing as a
consequence of themoney demand curve (see Fig. 7). The substitution
effect implies that consumption is increasing, while intuition would
expect a fall due to the negative relation between consumption andFig. 5. Impulse response function to a preference shock (a). In thick blue, we plot the impulse
1 (no excess of liquidity) and in dashed blue line, in regime 2 (of excess liquidity). In discont
rule. And in dashed green, we plot the IRF if the monetary authority is forced to follow theinterest rate. Contrary to the previous case, the growth effect on
inﬂation is largely dominated by the decrease of marginal costs.
Finally, including money in the policy rule is always stabilizing for
inﬂation and money growth except when the economy is facing a
velocity shock. However, the inclusion of money generally increases
the volatility of output. Consequently, as far as autocovariances are
concerned, the ECB two-pillar strategy seems to reduce the volatility
of inﬂation, of money growth and of interest rate but increases the
volatility of output (see Fig. 3). In terms of welfare, taking money into
account in the Taylor rule may be welfare improving if the weight of
stabilizing inﬂation and interest rate is predominant in the CB's
objective function. Besides, Fig. 3 indicates that the persistence of our
model is consistent with real data, whereas some covariances are not
perfectly replicated.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a rationale for the “two-pillar”monetary
policy strategy of the ECB by constructing a small DSGE model that
allows real balances to play an active role in explaining the euro area
business cycle. We ﬁnd some evidence that money plays indeed a
signiﬁcant role and enters in particular both in the IS and Phillips
curves. In such a context, it would be optimal for the central bank to
factor in monetary development into its monetary policy decisions.
However, we also ﬁnd some evidence that broad money and
consumption are substitutes rather complements in the euro area.
This result, as well as the impulse functions provided in the appendix,
are consistent with the recent ﬁndings by Giannone et al. (2009) who,
in the context of a large VAR model, evidence that in response to an
exogenous monetary tightening, real output slows down while broad
money aggregates (both M2 and M3) increase. This result stems from
the fact that short-term interest rates represent more the return than
the opportunity cost of broad money. Consequently, these results cast
some doubt on the relevance of M3 as the appropriate monetary
indicator for the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area andresponse functions (IRF) for themodel with augmented Taylor rule (model 4) in regime
inuous red line with crosses, we display the IRF for the model 2, i.e. with a simple Taylor
Taylor rule estimated by Gerdesmeier et al. (2007).
Fig. 6. Impulse response function to a productivity shock (z). In thick blue, we plot the impulse response functions (IRF) for the model with augmented Taylor rule (model 4) in
regime 1 (no excess of liquidity) and in dashed blue line, in regime 2 (of excess liquidity). In discontinuous red line with crosses, we display the IRF for the model 2, i.e. with a simple
Taylor rule. And in dashed green, we plot the IRF if the monetary authority is forced to follow the Taylor rule estimated by Gerdesmeier et al. (2007).would call for considering rather narrower aggregates such as M1 for
instance.
In addition, we ﬁnd some evidence that the ECB has reacted in a
systematic way to monetary developments but weak evidence that it
has reacted in a non-linear way, that is more aggressively to excess
money growth. One reason may be that, in practice, the referenceFig. 7. Impulse response function to a monetary policy shock (ur). In thick blue, we plot the im
regime 1 (no excess of liquidity) and in dashed blue line, in regime 2 (of excess liquidity). In
Taylor rule. And in dashed green, we plot the IRF if the monetary authority is forced to follvalue has remained unchanged since the inception of the ECB in a
context where M3 growth has systematically exceeded the reference
value. As a consequence, we only ﬁnd slight support for the presence
of shifts between two monetary policy regimes in the euro area.
Another reason is that what we call money in our set-up might not
correspond exactly to what is meant and measured by money inpulse response functions (IRF) for the model with augmented Taylor rule (model 4) in
discontinuous red line with crosses, we display the IRF for the model 2, i.e. with a simple
ow the Taylor rule estimated by Gerdesmeier et al. (2007).
reality and by the ECB, in particular because of the absence of a
banking sector in our model. Alternatively, this might also reﬂects
some concerns of the ECB regarding the reliability of M3. Indeed, the
ECB disregarded M3 developments in the aftermath of the 2000 stock
market crash, arguing M3 was distorted by portfolio shifts.
Finally, our ﬁndings call for further extensions, in particular to
better understand the role of money and the reasons for why it may
act as a substitute to consumption. The literature usually puts forward
two main explanations: ﬁrst, the existence of frictions and imperfec-
tions on credit markets (see for instance Attanasio, 1995); second
asset market segmentation (as in Alvarez et al., 2003 or King and
Thomas, 2007). These items are high in the research agenda
particularly in the context of the current ﬁnancial crisis which has
illustrated the need to better account for money, credit and asset
markets.
Appendix A
The linearized model and the steady state
yˆt + ω2 1−ρeð Þeˆt−ω1 1−ρað Þ aˆt = Et ybt+1 −ω1 rˆt−Et πbt+1  
+ ω2 mˆt−Et mbt+1  
πˆt−γpπbt−1=βEt πbt+1−γpπˆt 
+ κp ωp+
1
ω1
 
yˆt−κp
ω2
ω1
mˆt + κp
ω2
ω1
eˆt−κp 1+ ωp
 
zt
mˆt = γ1 yˆt−γ2 rˆt + γ3 eˆt
rˆt = ρr rˆt−1 + 1−ρrð Þ ρy ybt−1 + ρππbt−1 + ρ111ˆμ ft−1 + ρ212ˆμ ft−1 + ur;t
μˆ t = mˆt−mbt−1
aˆt = ρa abt−1 + a;t
eˆt = ρe ebt−1 + e;t
zˆt = ρz zbt−1 + z;t
uˆr;t = ρε ubr;t−1 + r;t
where
βr = π
ru2 = r−1ð Þeu1
ω1 =
−u1
cu11
ω2 = −
m= eð Þu12
cu11
γ1 =
crω2
mω1
+
r−1
ω1
 
γ2;
γ2 =
r
r−1ð Þ m= eð Þ
u2
r−1ð Þeu12−ru22
 
;
γ3 = 1− r−1ð Þγ2
ωp = −
FW nð ÞF nð Þ
F′ nð Þð Þ2
κp =
1−αp
 
1−βαp
 
αp 1 + ϑωp
 
and where u1=u1(c,m/e), u2=u2(c,m/e),u11=u11(c,m/e), u12=u12
(c,m/e), and u22=u22(c,m/e).Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2011.01.010.References
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